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A B S T R A C T
Electricity generation accounts for approximately 25% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, with more
than two-thirds of this electricity consumed by commercial or industrial users. To reduce electricity consump-
tion-related emissions eﬀectively at the level of individual ﬁrms, it is essential that they are measured accurately
and that decision-relevant information is provided to managers, consumers, regulators and investors. However,
an emergent GHG accounting method for corporate electricity consumption (the ‘market-based’ method) fails to
meet these criteria and therefore is likely to lead to a misallocation of climate change mitigation eﬀorts. We
identify two interrelated problems with the market-based method: 1. purchasing contractual emission factors is
very unlikely to increase the amount of renewable electricity generation; and 2. the method fails to provide
accurate or relevant information in GHG reports. We also identify reasons why the method has nonetheless been
accepted by many stakeholders, and provide recommendations for the revision of international standards for
GHG accounting. The case is important given the magnitude of emissions attributable to commercial/industrial
electricity consumption, and it also provides broader lessons for other forms of GHG accounting.
1. Introduction
Electricity generation currently produces around 25% of global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Victor et al., 2014), or about 12.4
GtCO2e/year. More than two-thirds of the electricity generated is con-
sumed by commercial and industrial users (IEA, 2016a). To reduce
electricity consumption-related emissions eﬀectively at the level of in-
dividual ﬁrms, it is essential that they are measured accurately and that
decision-relevant information is provided to managers, consumers,
regulators and investors. The compilation and public reporting of cor-
porate GHG inventories, ostensibly for this purpose, is becoming
mainstream business practice (CDP, 2016b). However, an emergent
‘market-based’ method for quantifying emissions associated with elec-
tricity consumption, which allows reporting entities to purchase and
claim the GHG attributes associated with renewable generation, is not
aligned with reducing emissions or providing accurate or relevant GHG
information. This issue is highly topical as recently published reporting
guidance from the GHG Protocol (WRI, 2015) has endorsed the market-
based approach, while the forthcoming update of ISO 14064-1 for
corporate GHG inventories provides an opportunity to establish a more
robust approach.
This perspective article aims to inform the development of GHG
accounting practice and international standards by providing a synth-
esis of existing studies, with additional analysis on the implications for
GHG accounting. Following a brief introduction to corporate GHG ac-
counting practice and the quantiﬁcation methods for purchased elec-
tricity, we set out two interrelated problems with the market-based
method, and then explore why, despite these problems, the market-
based approach has been accepted by many stakeholders. We conclude
with recommendations for a more robust accounting method, and
brieﬂy reﬂect on the applicability of the lessons learned for GHG ac-
counting more broadly.
2. Corporate GHG accounting and the market-based method
The ﬁrst internationally recognised guidance for corporate GHG
inventory reporting was published by the GHG Protocol in 2001
(WBCSD/WRI, 2004), with a corresponding ISO standard published in
2006 (ISO, 2006a). The GHG Protocol has since published revisions and
other standards, including guidance for emissions associated with
purchased electricity, termed ‘scope 2’ emissions (WRI, 2015). ‘Scope 2’
denotes the point-of-generation emissions from purchased grid elec-
tricity (or other forms of purchased energy, such as district heating and
cooling), while ‘scope 1’ covers direct emissions from facilities and
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machinery owned by a reporting company, and ‘scope 3’ includes any
other indirect emissions associated with a reporting company's broader
value chain, such as business travel or the disposal of waste (WBCSD/
WRI, 2004).
Standard practice is to estimate emissions using activity data for
each source and GHG. For example, if a small diesel car is used for
business travel, then the CO2 emissions associated with the car should
be calculated using data on its actual fuel consumption or distance
travelled, multiplied by a technology-speciﬁc emission factor, such as
0.1448 kgCO2/km travelled in a small diesel car (Defra/DECC, 2016). If
the speciﬁc source is not known then an average emission factor may be
used instead, e.g. the emission factor for an average car, 0.1856 kgCO2/
km travelled (Defra/DECC, 2016).
One feature of purchased electricity from a public distribution grid,
which makes it diﬃcult from an accounting perspective, is that it is not
possible to trace the electricity consumed by an entity back to any
particular grid-connected power plant (Raadal, 2013). To address this
physical reality, it has been standard practice to use a grid average
emission factor to estimate scope 2 emissions (e.g. those provided by
Defra/DECC (2016) or eGRID (2017)), which is derived by dividing the
total emissions from all the generation sources supplying a deﬁned
transmission and distribution grid area by the total amount of elec-
tricity supplied over a given period (Harmsen and Graus, 2013). This
approach is termed the ‘locational’ or ‘grid average’ method, as it re-
ﬂects the average emissions for the location in which the consumption
occurs (WRI, 2015).
An alternative accounting method is the ‘market-based’ or ‘con-
tractual’ approach, which permits a reporting company to apply an
emission factor associated with electricity from a speciﬁc generation
facility, such as a wind farm, with which the reporting company has a
contractual agreement to claim the associated emissions attributes. In
the case of most renewable technologies, the point-of-generation
emissions are zero, and so the reporting company will claim a zero
emission factor for its purchased electricity. Contractual arrangements
can take place through various instruments, such as Renewable Energy
Certiﬁcates (RECs), Guarantees of Origin (GOs), utility green tariﬀs, or
power purchase agreements (PPAs). It is worth emphasizing that these
contractual arrangements do not entail any changes to how electricity
from a renewable facility is physically delivered or consumed. The only
thing transacted is a claimed right to use the emission factor associated
with a certain amount of generation from a particular renewable energy
facility.
The GHG Protocol's Scope 2 Guidance, published in 2015, requires
that companies use both the locational grid average method and the
market-based method to report scope 2 emissions (i.e. dual reporting).
However, the guidance also allows companies to choose a single
method for meeting their reduction targets and for reporting their
supply chain emissions (WRI, 2015). The same guidance has been
adopted by CDP, formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP, 2016a).
In its current form, the guidance does not require the electricity asso-
ciated with any purchased emission factor to be additional: in other
words, it could be from a long-established facility, or one which re-
ceives government or other subsidies suﬃcient to justify its operation
already, in the absence of the contractual arrangement.
3. Problems with the market-based method
This section sets out two interrelated problems with contractual
emission factors and the market-based accounting method: purchasing
contractual emission factors does not inﬂuence or aﬀect the amount of
renewable electricity generated (except under very speciﬁc addition-
ality conditions, which are generally not fulﬁlled); and the market-
based accounting method fails to provide accurate or relevant in-
formation in GHG reports.
Problem 1:. Lack of additional renewable energy generation
There are structural reasons for expecting that markets for con-
tractual emission factors will fail to inﬂuence renewable energy supply.
In many countries there are now large amounts of renewable generation
available, because of government subsidies, legacy investments or be-
cause renewables are already economically viable (IEA, 2016b). The
attributes associated with some of this electricity are available for al-
location via contractual arrangements, without causing any increase in
the amount of renewable electricity generated. In some jurisdictions,
e.g. the U.S., renewable attributes used for compliance with regulatory
mandates are not also available for sale in the voluntary market,
whereas in other jurisdictions, e.g. many EU countries, renewable
generation can be used for compliance with regulatory targets and the
attributes from the same renewable generation can also be sold in the
voluntary market.
This situation, i.e. large amounts of renewable attributes available,
is illustrated in Fig. 1, adapted from Gillenwater (2008). Between 0–Q1
changes in demand for renewable attributes (e.g., shift from D1 to D2)
only involves the allocation of existing (non-additional) renewable
energy output, and the price reﬂects only the associated transaction
costs. A market equilibrium to the right of Q1 would drive additional
renewable generation. However, the higher costs of genuinely addi-
tional supply, and the elasticity of demand to higher prices, suggests
that the market for contractual emission factors is highly unlikely to
cause additional renewable capacity investments.1 Moreover, in many
countries the amount of renewable generation is increasing due to the
other drivers, such as government subsidies (IEA, 2016b), and therefore
the point at which additionality might be achieved (i.e. beyond Q1) is
continually advancing further beyond the reach of voluntary market
demand for contractual emission factors.
As an approximate indication of the demand increase needed before
there is an eﬀect on supply, ET Index Research data, which includes
2000 of the world's largest listed companies, shows 97 companies using
the market-based accounting method to report lower emissions,
equating to 22.2 million tCO2e/yr.2 This approximates to ~ 1% of
globally available renewable electricity generation in 2015,3 and
therefore demand for contractual emission factors would need to in-
crease a hundred-fold to reach the existing supply threshold for re-
newable attributes (which is continually increasing anyway), and only
once above that threshold would demand cause a fractional increase in
Price of 
RECs/ 
contractual 
emission 
factors
Quantity of RECs/ 
contractual emission 
factors
D1 D2
Supply
D3
0 Q1
Fig. 1. Demand and supply of contractual emission factors.
1 It is possible that there will be an additionality ‘window’ if the net cost of additional
generation does not exceed the market's willingness to pay for renewable attributes,
which increasingly may be the case as the cost of new renewable capacity decreases (i.e.
the supply curve beyond Q1 will be less inelastic). However, as noted above, this situation
would only be expected to arise after the baseline supply threshold has been reached.
2 Chief Technical Oﬃcer, ET Index Research, 2016, personal communication, 24
October.
3 This indicative estimate is based on 5.530 TWh of renewable electricity generation
(derived from U.S. EIA (2016)) and an assumed average grid emission factor of 0.4 tCO2e/
MWh (which approximates to the grid averages for the UK and the US).
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renewable generation.
There is also empirical evidence from the voluntary REC market in
the U.S., and GO market in Europe, which shows that purchasing
contractual emission factors does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence generation
from renewable technologies. The amount of renewable electricity
generated is the same in the absence of this market for generator-spe-
ciﬁc emission factors. Speciﬁcally, Gillenwater (2013) and Gillenwater
et al. (2014) ﬁnd that the amount of revenue from voluntary RECs in
the United States is too low and too uncertain to alter renewable ca-
pacity investment decisions. Voluntary REC prices instead largely re-
ﬂect marketing and transaction costs (Gillenwater, 2008). An empirical
study for the Netherlands shows similar results (Mulder and Zomer,
2016), and concludes that the voluntary market for GOs is unlikely to
increase renewable generation.
It should be emphasized that the current discussion relates speciﬁ-
cally to the inﬂuence of the voluntary market for contractual emission
factors, and not to the wholly distinct compliance market for RECs
within renewable portfolio standards, which have been successful in
driving additional renewable generation (Carley et al., 2016). The
conﬂation of these two markets is discussed further in Section 4 below
as one possible explanation for the perceived legitimacy of the volun-
tary market.
Problem 2:. Impact on the accuracy and relevance of GHG inventories
A further, and interrelated, problem with contractual emission
factors is the impact they have on the decision-usefulness of the in-
formation in GHG accounts. The illustrative example below demon-
strates this problem using the core accounting principles of accuracy
and relevance (WBCSD/WRI, 2004) as criteria for decision-usefulness.
Following the WRI (2015) guidance, Company A purchases con-
tractual emission factors for all of its consumed grid electricity, and
reports a scope 2 value of zero (0) tCO2e in its supply chain reporting,
and also a 30% reduction in its overall corporate emissions, as a result
of this newly claimed zero rating of its scope 2 emissions. By contrast,
the otherwise identical Company B does not purchase contractual
emission factors, instead using the equivalent money to implement an
energy eﬃciency programme that reduces its electricity consumption
and scope 2 emissions by 10%. Climate-friendly consumers and in-
vestors use the GHG reports from the two companies to inform their
purchasing and investment decisions, and favour Company A as it ap-
pears to exhibit superior environmental performance. However, Com-
pany A's consumption of grid electricity is unchanged, its purchase of
contractual emission factors has not increased the amount of renewable
generation, and therefore its actions have not reduced emissions to the
atmosphere. In contrast, Company B has reduced its demand for grid
electricity, some of which is supplied by fossil fuel power stations, and
therefore has credibly reduced emissions to the atmosphere. Company
A's GHG reporting does not appear to be an accurate reﬂection of the
emissions caused by its electricity consumption, and neither is the in-
formation relevant (i.e. useful) for informed decision-making. More-
over, the purchase of contractual emission factors is not a benign ac-
tivity, as the opportunity cost is to forgo genuine mitigation activities
that could otherwise have been funded.
Further, for Company A's use of contractual emission factors not to
lead to double-counting of the claimed renewable attributes, the
method requires all other reporting entities to also apply a ‘residual grid
mix’ emission factor. As this emission factor would be higher than the
grid average, due to removing some renewable generation from the
calculation, Company B's performance is again made to look worse,
although its actual contribution to reducing emissions is greater than
Company A's.
There are numerous real-world examples of companies that use
contractual emission factors to meet their reduction targets (e.g.
Unilever (2017), Marks and Spencer (2015), Nestlé (2014) and Philips
(2014)). Although the 22.2 million tCO2e/yr ﬁgure from ET Index Re-
search is a small quantity in terms of existing renewable supply, it is
nevertheless a large amount of emissions to misrepresent within cor-
porate GHG inventories.
One of the noteworthy aspects of the market-based method is that
many interested parties, including standard setters (e.g. WRI (2015)),
continue to endorse the method, despite the two problems described
above. The following section provides an initial exploration of why this
may have come about.
4. Explanations for the promotion of the market-based method
There appear to be a variety of reasons that explain why the market-
based method has been adopted by many reporting companies and
standard setters. Not all of these explanatory factors may apply to any
single stakeholder, but the combination of reasons may explain the
promotion and widespread, though not universal (e.g. see Defra/DECC
(2012)), acceptance of the market-based approach. The list of ex-
planations below provides an initial survey of explanatory factors,
which may serve as an agenda for further research.
a. Commercial interests. There are strong commercial drivers for the
use of contractual emission factors, on the part of both buyers and
sellers. They represent a windfall revenue stream, albeit small, for
those marketing these contractual instruments, as the claimed at-
tributes are derived from renewable electricity that is being gener-
ated anyway. Further, contractual factors provide a low cost means
of appearing to achieve emission reduction targets, and so are
popular with reporting companies. Corporations that engage in
corporate social responsibility primarily for public relations reasons
may also have less motivation for ensuring the actual environmental
integrity of their actions (Schaltegger and Burritt, 2015).
b. The ideology of the market. Contractual emission factors are often
presented as a market-based solution to climate change (e.g. The
International REC Standard, 2017), and advocates of non-regulatory
approaches may therefore view contractual emission factors fa-
vourably. However, in reality, contractual emission factors re-
present a market failure, because the implied goal (actual reduction
of emissions to the atmosphere) is in fact not delivered by con-
tractual emission factors (as discussed in Section 2), and therefore
the approach has only the appearance, and not the substance, of a
market-based solution. In addition to the label ‘market-based
method’ itself, other market or business related terms are used in the
GHG Protocol's Scope 2 Guidance, such as ‘risks and opportunities’
(2015, p. 15), ‘consumer choice’ (2015, p. 26), and ‘market signals’
(2015, p. 27). However, the ‘risks and opportunities’ indicated by
market-based results are only those created by the method itself,
such as the risk of government regulation that is based on con-
tractual arrangements, or legal risks from misreporting contractual
arrangements. ‘Consumer choice’ is suggestive of additionality, in
that consumer choice is generally assumed to inﬂuence supply,
whereas this is not the case with contractual factors (as discussed in
Section 2). ‘Market signals’ also implies a positive action, however,
the implied ‘signal’ does not achieve a change in renewable energy
investment, and thereby, generation capacity.
c. Implied legitimacy from compliance markets. RECs were in-
itially developed as compliance instruments within renewable
portfolio standards, with utility companies retiring RECs to de-
monstrate achievement of a mandated level of renewable supply
(Menanteau et al., 2003; Gillenwater, 2008). This regulatory back-
ground allows consumers to conﬂate RECs used for regulatory
purposes with those sold to contractually claim renewable energy
emission factors, and thereby lends an appearance of legitimacy or
credibility to the subsequent practice of electricity consumers using
RECs to contractually claim renewable energy emission factors.
d. Regulatory capture. Some regulators and environmental NGOs,
including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and World
Wildlife Fund (WWF), who might otherwise be relied upon to
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scrutinise the environmental integrity of GHG accounting practices,
have introduced their own renewable electricity attribute trading
programmes (US EPA, 2016; WindMade, 2016), and therefore have
an interest in downplaying or ignoring the problems with the
market-based method. There appears to be a reluctance on the part
of environmental watchdogs to criticize the practices of companies
and environmental organizations that have the appearance of
striving to support renewable energy. Furthermore, the GHG Pro-
tocol, as a voluntary, non-governmental standard-setting organisa-
tion, depends, in part, for its funding on the very companies that
have a commercial interest in buying and selling contractual emis-
sion factors. All standard setters are vulnerable to the asymmetry of
power within their stakeholder engagement processes (Boström and
Hallström, 2010), and the Scope 2 Guidance appears to be the ﬁrst
standard produced by the GHG Protocol which has had signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial implications for certain stakeholder groups. Although the
GHG Protocol working group for the Scope 2 Guidance was open to
all interested parties, it is likely that those organizations with the
greatest commercial interest would also spend the most time and
resources promoting their desired outcomes.
e. Lack of awareness. Consumers and policy-makers are generally
unaware of the problems associated with the market-based method.
There is an everyday presumption that consumer choice ultimately
drives supply. However, as discussed in Section 2, numerous other
factors drive renewable energy supply, such as government policies
and commercial viability, and evidence shows that consumer de-
mand for renewable attributes (versus physical electricity demand)
does not play a signiﬁcant role (and would be more expensive at the
point where it might begin to inﬂuence renewable energy invest-
ment). The lack of awareness of the problem of additionality is also
to be expected given the marketing messages used to sell contractual
factors, which are often opaque or misleading on the point of ad-
ditionality. For example, Natural Capital Partners, a retailer of
contractual emission factors, state:
‘Clients are able to immediately and eﬀectively meet their global
renewable energy targets, support the generation of renewable en-
ergy in the locations of interest to them, and address their Scope 2
impacts, through our customised, global portfolios of renewable
energy instruments. Our renewable energy solutions meet all
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Protocol requirements and CDP quality cri-
teria, providing greater recognition to businesses buying renewable
energy certiﬁcates’ (Natural Capital Partners, 2017).
f. Conceptual confusion. The distinction between attributional and
consequential GHG accounting is well understood in some ﬁelds,
such as life cycle assessment (LCA), but much less so in the area of
corporate GHG accounting, which has traditionally used attribu-
tional accounting (Brander et al., 2015). This has led to conceptual
confusion in some of the justiﬁcations for the market-based method.
For example, the Scope 2 Guidance suggests that additionality is only
relevant to consequential forms of GHG accounting, such as project-
level accounting, as it is only these methods that measure changes in
emissions relative to what would have occurred in the absence of an
intervention (WRI, 2015, p. 90). In contrast, attributional in-
ventories of emissions, such as corporate GHG inventories, only
need to allocate total emissions between reporting entities without
double-counting. However, to be accurate and relevant, GHG in-
ventories must reﬂect the emissions caused by the reporting entity.
The fundamental issue with the contractual method is that it does
not represent any causal relationship between the reporting entity
and the emissions reported. Another example of conceptual confu-
sion is the argument, again present in the Scope 2 Guidance (WRI,
2015, p.90), that the market-based method reﬂects choices compa-
nies make about their electricity products. However, the choice in
question relates only to the purchase of contractual emission factors
and is not about the physical delivery or generation of electricity, so
the argument is equivalent to claiming that contractual emission
factors are justiﬁed because they reﬂect the decision to purchase
contractual emission factors. The resulting accounts only reﬂect the
accounting arrangements themselves, and do not provide any deci-
sion-relevant information about actual emissions. To be useful, en-
vironmental accounts must represent something other than their
own accounting rules.
The above list of explanatory factors demonstrates the range and
interaction of issues at play in obscuring the two problems with the
market-based method, and indicates a considerable opportunity for
further social, political, critical and normative research. Further em-
pirical analysis of the eﬀects of voluntary contractual arrangements
with respect to causing increased renewable electricity generation in
speciﬁc markets, and whether these markets could be improved (for
example by more accurate GHG accounting rules), would also be useful.
Focusing for now on the practical implications, the following section
provides a number of recommendations for the treatment of purchased
electricity within GHG inventories.
5. Recommendations
ISO 14064-1 for organisational GHG inventories (ISO, 2006a) is
currently under revision, with the updated standard expected to be
published in 2018. We strongly recommend that this ISO standard, and
also a revised version of the current GHG Protocol Scope 2 Guidance,
should adopt the following approach:
a. The locational grid average method should be the only method
used to calculate and report scope 2 emissions. This is not to
suggest that the locational method is perfect, nor that locational
emission factors cannot be improved. For instance, ideally grid
average emission factors should be speciﬁc to the time at which
consumption takes place (Spork et al., 2015), e.g. using smart me-
ters, but currently such high temporal resolution emission factors
are not commonly available. In addition, the boundary for calcu-
lating the grid average should be based on the grid balancing area in
which electricity supply is balanced with demand, whereas at pre-
sent many grid average factors are often based on more arbitrary
national or regional jurisdictional boundaries (Colett et al., 2015).
Notwithstanding these issues, the locational grid average is the best
available method for reﬂecting the emissions caused by companies’
contribution to aggregate demand on the grid.
b. Actions that genuinely result in additional grid-connected re-
newable energy generation should be quantiﬁed using a con-
sequential accounting method, and reported separately to the
corporate GHG inventory. For example, if a company enters into a
long-term power purchase agreement that enables investment in
new renewable energy generation capacity that would not otherwise
have been viable, the emission reductions caused by that action
could be quantiﬁed using methods such as ISO 14064-2 (2006b) or
the GHG Protocol's Guidelines for Quantifying Reductions from
Grid-Connected Electricity Projects (WBCSD/WRI, 2007), and re-
ported as additional information to the corporate GHG inventory.
In addition to the standards for corporate GHG accounting, the draft
text (as of June 2017) for ISO 14067 for product carbon footprinting
also endorses the use of contractual emission factors for grid electricity.
Exactly the same problems arise with contractual emission factors at the
product-level (i.e. no increase in the amount of renewable generation,
and inaccurate and irrelevant information in the reported footprint),
and the same recommended approach, above, should therefore be ap-
plied within ISO 14067.
6. Conclusions
In summary, how companies measure and report the GHG emissions
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arising from their consumption of electricity is important not only for
those companies, but also for consumers, regulators, investors, and
society as a whole. The generation of electricity for commercial and
industrial consumption makes a signiﬁcant contribution to global GHG
emissions, in the order of 8 GtCO2e/year (Victor et al., 2014). Mis-
representing responsibility for these emissions through using the
market-based method therefore has the potential to signiﬁcantly un-
dermine global climate change mitigation eﬀorts.
As a guiding principle, we recommend that all environmental in-
ventories must reﬂect the impacts caused by the reporting entity,
otherwise they are simply not useful for managing environmental im-
pacts. This applies to corporate-level inventories, but also any other
types of inventory, such as product-level (ISO, 2013), city-level
(Gudipudi et al., 2016), or building-level inventories (Lai, 2014). We
also hope that the case of contractual emission factors will provide
governments, UNFCCC negotiators, and corporate managers with a
useful cautionary tale against similar creative accounting methods that
distort rather than measure reality.
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